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Abstract
Compliance with labour law has costs and benets which may depend on the institutional
environment in which rms operate. Although several studies have documented a negative e¤ect
of informality on rmsproductivity and growth it is a fact that rms may resort to undeclared
employment to escape excessive tax or regulatory burden. We argue that rms may respond to
strict employment protection legislation through accrued informality thus (partially) o¤setting
the negative e¤ect of informality on productivity. We exploit the Italian dismissal legislation
imposing higher ring costs for rms with more than 15 workers and show that informality
reduces the turnover of formal jobs for rms above the 15 workers threshold; furthermore, while
the overall e¤ect of informality on rmsproductivity is negative, the di¤erential e¤ect for rms
above the threshold as compared to smaller rms is positive and signicant.
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1 Introduction
Shadow economy is a common phenomenon in both developing and developed countries. It accounts
for 10% to 20% of GDP in most OECD countries, 20% to 30% in Southern European OECD
countries and in Central European transition economies (Schneider and Enste, 2000). The extent
of the shadow economy is closely related to the existence of an informal labour market. Even in the
more advanced countries where the shadow economy mostly assumes the form of underreporting of
income to the tax authorities, it involves a large use of undeclared (informal) labour.1 Informal work
is the norm in most-middle income countries, and it is also sizable in some high-income economies
(OECD, 2004, 2009). Thought in the latest group, informal employment generally takes the form of
under-declered work,2 nevertheless in some OECD countries (as Southern Europen and transition
countries) and, within countries, in some industries the share of wholly-undeclered workers may be
substantial.
Against the pervasiveness of the shadow economy, most empirical evidence shows that going
informal is detrimental for rms productivity even when it is just partial. This may occur for
a number of reasons. Informal rms have a limited access to capital markets (Cull et al., 2007)
and to market support institutions and law enforcement (World Bank, 2007). Moreover, they tend
to invest less both in physical and human capital (Gandelman and Rasteletti, 2013). If operating
informally implies costs for rms in terms of lower productivity, on the other side rms often resort
to informality to escape excessive regulatory pressure on their activity.3 Among the others, high
labour adjustment costs induced by rigid labour market regulation (e.g. employment protection
legislation) give incentives for rms to create (and destroy) jobs in the informal sector to avoid
severance costs and increase exibility (Di Porto et al, 2016). As a consequence, in an overregulated
labour market, the added exibility resulting from the use of informal workers may enable rms to
adjust more in response to business cycle uctuations (Bosch and Esteban-Pretel, 2012) and operate
more e¢ ciently (Almeida and Carneiro, 2012).
The coexistence in many economies of formal and informal labour markets allows rms to hire
1 In this paper we refer as informal employment as workers who are engaged in the production of legal goods
and services and are not o¢ cially registered, are excluded from social security benets and the protection a¤orded
by formal labour market contracts. Analogously, we follow Schneider et al. (2010) and dene informal economy as
comprising of market-based legal production of goods and services deliberately hidden from public authorities to avoid
paying taxes, social security, contributions, and to meet legal obligations/requirements and market standards.
2Under-declaration is the situation where employers decleare only part of the wages that are paid to employees
(OECD, 2009).
3Ultimate causes of underground economy may thus be found within the institutional framework in which rms
operate as, for example, the level of taxation and scal regulations (Loayza, 1996; Friedman et al., 2000; Loayza et
al., 2005; Packard et al, 2012), the strictness of labour and product market regulations (Botero et al, 2003; Djankov
et al., 2002; Loayza et al., 2005; Packard et al, 2012), poor institutions in general (Friedman et al., 2000; Scheneider,
2000; Loayza et al., 2005; Packard et al, 2012). Furthermore, formality implies costs which go beyond the burden of
taxes, such as compliance with legal requirements or rent seeking bureaucracy (Sarte, 2000).
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and dismiss workers in both the regulated (formal) and unregulated (informal) sector.4 The decision
of rms to adjust in the formal or informal sector (and the extent of such an adjustment) depends
on the trade-o¤ between the costs associated to formal and informal employment. Formal contracts
have to abide with employment protection legislation (EPL) and other labour taxes. Informal jobs
avoid labour regulation, but they imply costs in terms of exclusion from certain public goods and
services (e.g., social infrastructure, property rights and the justice system), together with nes and
other non-monetary costs (e.g. loss of reputation, social stigma, etc.) in case of detection.
In this paper we analyze the e¤ect of informality on turnover of formal jobs and productivity
of rms which are subject to di¤erent degree of labour market regulation (EPL). We claim that, in
presence of high ring costs, rms with an easier access to informal sector may benet from greater
exibility in their employment and production decisions which, in turn, lead them to operate more
e¢ ciently and increase productivity. As a result, the negative e¤ect of informality on productivity
may be relatively lower for rms facing higher ring costs.
From the empirical side, the extent of underground activities and informal economy is di¢ cult
to detect and measure. Since workers and rms who operate irregularly are unlikely to provide
information on their hidden activities, this makes it di¢ cult to obtain direct data on informality at
rm level. Nevertheless, a number of reliable indicators has been produced in order to measure the
informal economy at a more aggregate level. In our analysis we use tax evasion estimated at the
province level as a proxy of the costs for rms and workers of going informal in that particular local
market. The low degree of tax compliance is related to a large dimension of the informal labour
market, which implies lower searching and hiring costs in the informal sector for rms, as well as,
in general, to a more positive attitudes towards informality.
The impact of informality on rms productivity is then analyzed by means of a regression
discontinuity design (RDD) that exploits the variation in EPL across Italian rms below and above
an employment size threshold (15 employees), the EPL provisions being more stringent for rms
above the 15-employee threshold. The discontinuous change in legislation at the threshold should
result in a discontinuous e¤ect of informality on rmsbehavior. We use this idea to study two
related aspects. First we consider whether in presence of a large share of informality, rms job
reallocation in the formal labour market drops just above the threshold, implying that the presence
of an informal sector reduces turnover of formal (regulated) jobs when ring costs are higher since
rms have an incentive to hire workers in the informal sectors.5 Second, we analyze weather the
4Although we acknowledge that there are industries/sectors that are essentially formal (such as the public sector),
we follow Bosch andvEsteban-Pretel (2012) and argue that rms decision on adjusting in the formal and informal
secotrs concerns jobs with similar characteristics.
5There is a large empirical and theoretical literature which shows that strict EPL has a negative e¤ect on both
job creation and job destruction, reducing the overall turnover of regular jobs (Bertola et al, 1999; Blanchard and
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negative e¤ect of informality on the productivity of rms just above the threshold is relatively abated
as compared to the impact below the threshold.
To this purpose we use rm level detailed balance sheet data for a sample of small rms around
the 15 workers threshold. Focusing on small rms has two main advantages: i) the sample of rms
is homogenous enough as to preserve comparability between the treatment and the control group;
ii) the incidence of informality is higher for small rms. One reason is that as the marginal cost of
informality increases with rmssize due to concealment e¤orts (Fortin et al. 1997; Carfora et al.)
which may cause rms to operate below the optimal size to avoid the attention of scal authorities
(OECD 2004).
In order to identify the impact of informality proxied with tax evasion on rms labor adjustments
and productivity we have to tackle the problem of endogeneity. Indeed it may be that propensity to
tax compliance, labor adjustments and productivity are driven by local factors such as for example
the quality of institutions, cultural factors, etc.; in addition our results could be biased by reverse
causality, as tax compliance may be inuenced by labor market conditions and rmsperformance.
We address endogeneity in two ways: i) we include rms xed e¤ects; ii) we identify two instruments
for tax evasion, namely the judges turnover in civil courts and the timing of local (province)
elections. Both instruments are used separately and jointly.
As far as judgesturnover within judicial districts is concerned, it is well known that tax com-
pliance depends on the level of the enforcement of legislation, which in turn is related to courts
e¢ ciency. One of the determinants of Courts internal organization has been shown to be the
turnover rate of the judges (Guerra and Tagliapietra, 2005). Judges turnover is not related to
our depend variables nor it is determined by local factors; indeed the transfer of a judge is the
result of independent decisions taken from di¤erent agents and approved on the bases of objective
circumstances provided for by the law. It is then exogenous with respect to our empirical model.
As to the timing of local (province) level elections, the impact of the occurrence of elections on
the probability of auditing is a well-established result in the literature (Besley et al. 2014; Skouras
and Christodoulakis, 2013); a change in the (local) ruling coalition can represent a shock to local
entrenched powers and by this way inuence the enforcement of tax regulation. Although Italian
provinces have no tax competence (as most taxes are established at the central Government level
while local taxes are decided upon and collected by municipalities) tax auditing and collection is
carried out a province level, within the same boundaries of province constituencies. In addition,
province elections occur at intervals which are established by law (i.e. every 5 years), therefore the
timing of election is exogenous.
Portugal, 2001; Hijzen et al, 2013; Vindigni et al, 2015).
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The panel dimension of our data also allows to control for unobserved heterogeneity among
sectors and provinces via xed e¤ects. Therefore, our main results are not driven by cross-sectional
di¤erences among provinces, such as cultural, economic and social characteristics that may impact on
both labour market adjustments, rmsproductivity and informality decisions. Finally, our results
are also robust to the inclusion of province-specic time dummies, which captures any time and
province variant omitted factors - such as local economic development and informal institutions -
which could inuence both productivity and informality.
Our results show that lower costs of informality reduces labor reallocation rates in the formal
sector for rms facing higher ring costs conrming that they tend to adjust more on the informal
sector. Moreover, rms with higher ring costs experience productivity gains from informality
resulting from the opportunity to adjust in the unregulated sector. In other words, while the overall
e¤ect of informality on productivity is still negative in line with the literature the incremental
e¤ect of informality on labor productivity for rms facing higher ring costs (i.e. rms above the 15
workersthreshold) is positive. A quantication of our results suggests that moving from the 90th
to the 10th percentile of the informality distribution (i.e. from the province of Avellino to Gorizia
in our sample), would lead to a 10 percentage points decrease in the turnover of formal employment
(more than 50 percent of the average turnover) for rms above the threshold relative to smaller rms
and an increase of productivity of about 16 percent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the theoretical framework.
Section 3 illustrates the institutional background and discusses the instruments. Section 4 presents
the main characteristics of the data. Section 5 sets out the empirical methodology. The main results
of the article are presented d in Section 6. In Section 7 we provide some robustness checks and
Section 8 concludes.
2 Informality, labour regulation and rm productivity
Three strands of literature contribute to explain the relationship between informality and rms
productivity in presence of ring costs: (i) the literature studying the linkage between the informal
economy and the formal institutional and regulatory environment; (ii) the literature on the e¤ects of
informality on rmsoutcome; (iii) the literature focusing specically on the e¤ects of labor market
regulations on rmsoutcome.
2.1 Informality and institutions
Institutions inuence the decision of rms to go underground for two main reasons. First, the
compliance to o¢ cial rules implies excessive costs to rms, for example because of high tax rates,
overregulation, excessive bureaucracy or strict labour legislation; second, institutions are weak, as
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in presence of corruption or bad legal environment. Both types of reasons may coexist, and often
do, as shown by a large body of empirical literature.
Focusing on Latin America Loayza (1996) shows that the size of the informal sector depends
positively on the tax burden and on labour market restrictions and negatively on the quality of
government institutions such as the quality of bureaucracy, corruption and the rule of law. In a
study concerning 69 countries, Friedman et al. (2000) provide evidence that over-regulation, weak
legal environment and corruption determine the size of the informal sector, undermining public
nance and the capacity of the state to enforce property rights. Considering 21 high developed
OECD countries. Schneider (2011) nds that tax policies and the social security burden are among
the main determinants of the shadow economy, followed by tax morale and the quality of state
institutions.
Restricting to the ambit of the labour market, the e¤ect of taxes, labour regulations and social
security is often analyzed with respect to the substitution between the regulated and unregulated
employment (Schneide and Enste, 2000). Lemieux et al. (1994) show a negative elasticity of the
hours worked in the shadow (untaxed) economy with respect to the net wage rate in the o¢ cial
sectors; Botero et al. (2004) provide evidence that protective collective relation laws are associated
with a larger shadow economy. Using a moral hazard framework with credit rationing, Straub (2005)
demonstrates that labour market rigidities push rms to remain informal and reduce employment
in the formal sector. More recently, Di Porto et al. (2015) have documented a positive relationship
between labour market rigidities and the size of the shadow economy in around 30 countries.
Following this literature, we assume that in presence of high ring costs rms tend to adjust more
in the informal sector. However we take a step further and analyse the impact of rmsdecision to
adjust informally - in order to avoid strict EPL - on productivity.
2.2 Informality and rmsoutcome
Informality entails several types of costs: i) direct costs related to punishment or concealment costs
in case of unreported activities are detected; ii) constraints on rmsdimension as to the optimal
scale or to optimal capital intensity; ii) limited access to market supporting institutions and law
enforcement services The latter ranges from poor protection by the juridical system against crime
to a reduced capacity to enforce contracts and property rights, which also impairs rmsaccess to
capital markets
Loayza (1996) shows that the size of the public sector negatively a¤ects economic growth by
increasing the number of activities which do not use public services or use them less e¢ ciently.
Several studies show that rmssize is negatively related to tax evasion (Dabla Norris et al. 2008);
one reason is that as the marginal cost of tax evasion increases with rmssize due to concealment
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e¤orts (Fortin et al. 1997; Carfora et al.) which may cause rms to operate below the optimal size to
avoid the attention of scal authorities (OECD 2004). Focusing on developing countries, La Porta
and Schleifer (2008) provide evidence that unregistered rms are far less productive than formal
rms because of the reduced ability of their managers, higher cost of capital, and insu¢ cient scale.
Although going informal entails important drawbacks for rms, it also allows to escape costs and
constraints related to the institutional environment. Therefore the nal e¤ect of rmsproductivity
may be ambiguous. Tax evasion may be a way for smaller rms to get nancing, so that smaller
rms tend to increase tax evasion when they have a limited access to nancial markets (Beck. et al.,
2005; 2010). Sarte (2000) shows that when the informal sector arise as a response against predatory
and rent-seeking bureaucracy, it may be e¢ cient for rms to locate economic activity in this sector.
Almeida and Carneiro (2009) show that reduced informality caused by a stricter enforcement of
employment regulation constraints rmssize in Brazil and reduces productivity.
Our results conciliates the two views; we show that while the overall e¤ect of informality on
rmsproductivity is negative, the productivity loss is smaller for those rms facing higher ring
costs
2.3 Labour regulation, job turnover and productivity
Since the seminal contribution by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), labour reallocation is considered
crucial in determining labour market outcomes through the capacity of the rm to quickly adjust to
exogenous shocks. In a world where agents (rms and workers) are heterogeneous and the matching
process between vacancies and workers is costly, when a shock hits the economy the desired allocation
of jobs among rms and sectors changes, leading to job destruction on the one hand and to the
creation of new vacancies on the other. Firmscapacity to reallocate labour depends on the strictness
of employment protection legislation (EPL); a higher degree of workers protection has been shown
to unambiguously reduce both job creation and job destruction (Hopenhayn and Rogerson 1993;
Mortensen and Pissarides 1994; Pissarides 2000).
A more controversial issue is how this e¤ect translates into changes in productivity at rm level.
On the one hand, in a standard search and matching model, the presence of dismissal costs will reduce
the productivity threshold at which workers and rms decide to terminate their relationship, and
this causes a decrease in rmsaverage productivity. On the other, given that the worker-vacancy
match implies the presence of quasi-rents, which are typically allocated between workers and rms
through a Nash bargaining mechanism, an increase in ring costs reduce rmsoutside options.6
This induces a rise in the reservation productivity (below which rms do not hire) and potentially
6When a rm is bargaining the wage with a continuing employee, the threat point in the bargaining process is the
value of an unlled vacancy minus the ring cost that the rm must pay if the negotiation is not successful.
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increases rms average productivity since less productive matches are not realized (Lagos 2006;
Autor 2007).
There are other channels through which the presence of dismissal costs can impact rmspro-
ductivity. When ring is costly, the rm has a lower incentive to undertake risky investments with
high returns and high risk of failure in order to minimize the likelihood of paying ring costs. In this
respect, Bartelsman and Hinloopen (2005) nd that EPL has a signicant negative e¤ect on invest-
ments in ICT. Analogously, Saint-Paul (2002) argues that high ring costs may induce secondary
innovation that improves existing products rather than introducing more innovative ones. Capital
accumulation is another channel through which the extent of ring costs may a¤ect productivity.
Again, an increase in ring costs has an ambiguous e¤ect on capital to labour ratio. On the one
hand, stricter dismissal rules may induce a substitution e¤ect from labour to capital (Besley and
Burgess 2004). On the other hand, EPL strengthens workersbargaining power and exacerbate hold-
up problems related to the investment activity, resulting in less investment and capital stock per
worker (Bertola 1994; Garibaldi and Violante 2005). Finally, dismissal costs inuence productivity
since it a¤ects employeesbehaviour and incentives. Belot, Boone and Van Ours (2007) show that an
increase in the stability of the employment relationship induces to invest in productivity-enhancing
human capital, which would otherwise be suboptimal because of the hold-up problem. Conversely,
by using a standard model of e¢ ciency wages Ichino and Riphahn (2005) claim that when ring
become more costly for the rm workers tend to exert less e¤ort since there is less threat of layo¤
in response to shirking.
3 The institutional background and the identication strategy
3.1 Employment protection legislation and the 15 employees threshold
According to Italys Statuto dei Lavoratori, passed in 1970, an individual dismissal is legal only when
it satises a just cause, e.g. it can be justied by an objective reason (concerning the production
activity for example) or subjective reasons, which are mainly related to misconduct on the part of
the worker. The worker has always the right to appeal the rms decision and the nal outcome
ultimately depends on the courts ruling on the specic case. If the worker does not appeal the ring
decision, or if the dismissal is ruled fair, the legislation does not impose any severance payment to
the rm.7 Conversely, when the dismissal is ruled unfair, the judge imposes a specic compensation
on the rm.
The maximum compensation to which unlawfully red workers are entitled to varies with rm
size in two important dimensions. For rms with less than 16 employees, the unfairly dismissed
7When the layo¤ is ruled fair, a common practice in Italy is that the labour union pays all the legal costs.
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worker must be compensated with a xed severance payment that varies between 2.5 and 6 months
of salary independently on the length of judicial procedure and with no obligation of reinstatement of
the dismissed worker. Conversely, for rms with more than 15 employees, to which Article 18 of the
Statuto dei Lavoratori applies, the worker is entitled to a compensation equal to forgone wages, social
security and health insurance contributions for a period from the date of the dismissal to the judicial
settlement of the case (with a minimum of 5 months and with no upper limits). Moreover he/she
can choose either to be reinstated in the rm or to be paid an additional nancial compensation of
15 months of salary.8 This implies that: (a) ring costs for rms above the 15 employees threshold
are always higher than those for smaller rms; and (b) the cost of unfair dismissals increases with
the duration of the labour trial only for rms with more than 15 employees .
A number of papers have exploited the discontinuity in EPL at the 15 employees threshold in
Italy. These studies are mainly focused on identifying the overall e¤ect of EPL on rms employment
decisions and productivity.9 Di¤erently, our empirical strategy allows us to identify the extent to
which informality a¤ects rmsproductivity in di¤erent ring costs regimes. More specically, our
identication scheme is based on the idea that the costs of informality are di¤erent for rms below
and above the threshold, i.e. rms subject to a stricter EPL may benet more from hiring in the
informal sector. The discontinuity in ring legislation at the 15-employees threshold should allow
us to isolate the e¤ect of interest (the di¤erential impact of informality on productivity) from other
(unobserved) factors such as the degree of local economic development, quality of (local) institutions,
that may a¤ect all rms within the same location.
3.2 The instrumental variables
In order to corroborate our results and control for the potential endogeneity of the indicator of
judicial ine¢ ciency, we also present two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates using two instruments
for the duration of labour trials: (1) the judgesturnover in judicial districts and (2) the timing of
the local (province) elections.
8The recent reform of the Italian labour market, in force since July 18, 2012, has changed some of the rules related
to the termination of the employment relationship. In particular, also for rms with more than 15 employees, it has
been restricted reinstatement to certain specic cases of unfair or unjustied dismissal and introduced an upper limit
up to 24 monthssalary to the compensation a rm has to pay in case of unfair dismissal. The change in legislation
does not a¤ect our estimates, since our data covers the period 2006-2010.
9Boeri and Jimeno (2005) study the e¤ect of employment protection on lay-o¤ probabilities by comparing small
and large rms. Garibaldi et al (2004), and Schivardi and Torrini (2008) assess the e¤ects of employment protection
on the size distribution of Italian rms, by looking at the probability of rm size adjustments around the 15 employee
threshold. Similarly, Hijzen et al (2013) analyse the e¤ect of di¤erent EPL provisions on the composition of workforce,
worker turnover and productivity of rms above and below the 15 employees threshold. All these papers identify the
e¤ect of employment protection by exploiting the fact that Italian rms with fewer than 15 employees are subject to
lower dismissal costs than rms with more than 15 employees. Other studies exploit both the discontinuity in EPL at
the 15 employees threshold as well as the temporal variation in the legislation, in order to assess the e¤ect of reforms
on job ows (Kluger and Pica, 2008), wages (Leonardi and Pica, 2013), productivity and capital deepening (Cingano
et al, 2015). Gianfreda and Vallanti (2017) show that stricter EPL due to labour trial delays reduce job reallocation
rates and productivity for rms above the 15 workers threshold.
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3.2.1 Judgesturnover
Tax compliance depends on the level of enforcement of legislation (detection and nes), which in
turn is related to the e¢ ciency of civil courts. It has been show that judgesturnover has a quite
strong impact on the e¢ ciency of Courts internal organization (Guerra and Tagliapietra, 2005).
Therefore this instrument is correlated with the extent of local informality through the e¢ ciency of
judicial courts and also satises the exclusion restriction as the transfer of judges from one o¢ ce
to another is the result of a number of decisions taken by agents at di¤erent levels of the judiciary
hierarchy who respond to di¤erent sets of incentives. The transfer generally follows a three-step
procedure: i) the publication of vacant positions to be lled ii) the request of the judge who is
willing to be transferred and occupy the vacant position; iii) the approval by the self-governing body
of the judiciary, the Consiglio Superiore della Magistatura (CSM). Judges turnover rate within
each districts depends on the number of vacant positions available which in turn is related to career
advancements or retirement. Once a vacant position is created, the judge who is willing to be
transferred has to apply to the CSM; as a general rule, judges cannot be transferred to a di¤erent
assignment or district without their consent.10 Once applications are received, the CSM decides on
the basis of a competitive procedure among candidates. The criteria for the CSM collegial decision
are the following: competence, which is assessed on the basis of the functions so far carried out and
the judges capacities; the judges health status and his/her family members (o¤springs, spouse,
parents and brothers/sisters if leaving with the judge, in some cases relatives and relatives-in-law);
family ties; merit (which also depends on the fact that in the past the judge has occupied vacancies
for which an urgent procedure had been set up or vacancies for which no application had been
received); seniority.11 Therefore, the complexity of the transfer procedure, to which the decisions
taken by di¤erent agents contribute, is such that the turnover rate in each district ends up to be
independent from (local) factors that might also a¤ect rm-level outcomes.
3.2.2 Local political elections
The inuence of electoral cycle on scal choices has been widely investigated since Nordhaus (1975).
Recent literature on this topic follows two main approaches. A strand of contributions build on
models based on information asymmetries between voters and politicians following Rogo¤ and Sibert
10An important feature of the Italian judicial system is the principle of "inamovibilità", according to which a
judge can be transferred to a di¤erent Court or to a di¤erent assignment only upon his/her consent. The principle
of "inamoviblità" is a constitutional provision aiming at assuring the independence of the judiciary, which could be
undermined should a judge be compelled to quit his/her activity for suspension or transfer. There are some ecceptions
namely the need to cover vacancies in cases established by law, as disciplinary actions or for reasons of "incompatibilità
ambientale", i.e. the judge is considered incompatible with the workplace. The judge can appeal the CSM decision
in all cases.
11See the "Circolare 15098 of November 30, 1993 and subsequent amendments. Health status and familiy ties are
not taken in consideration for top positions, such as for example the Supreme Court.
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(1988) and Rogo¤ (1990): according to this line, politicians manipulate budgetary instruments to
signal their competency in electoral and pre-electoral periods. Another strand of literature focus on
tax choices as a tool to increase the probability of re-election; in this framework not only tax setting
but also the probability of auditing and controls can be inuenced by the occurrence of an election.
On the empirical ground, focusing on German municipalities Foremny and Riedel (2014) show that
the growth rate of local business taxes is signicantly lower in election periods while Skouras and
Christodoulakis (2013) nd that around election audit activity by tax collector is reduced and
underreporting increases in Greece; Ronconi (2009) show that the occurrence of a political election
inuence actual enforcement of labour legislation. In addition, other studies focus on the ruling
coalition attitude toward tax compliance of as a determinant of tax evasion: a change in the (local)
ruling coalition can represent a shock to local entrenched powers and by this way inuence the
enforcement of tax regulation (Besley et al, 2014). Fantozzi and Raitano (2015) investigated tax
compliance in Italy as a result of a change in ruling parties and found an increase in self-employed
underreporting under centre-right coalition.
Building on these contributions, we instrument the tax gap at province level with a dummy
indicating the occurrence of a province election in the year. There are several reasons for choosing
province level elections. On the administrative point of view, the Italian territory is organized in
regions, provinces and municipalities.12 Although the Italian provinces have no a direct tax com-
petence (as most taxes are established at the central Government level while local taxes are decided
upon and collected by municipalities),t a tax auditing and collection is carried out a province level,
within the same boundaries of province constituencies (by the so called Direzioni Provinciali).
Therefore, we interpret the occurrence of a province election as a potential shock to the local estab-
lished powers. Elections can bring a switch in the local ruling coalition, which may inuence rms
expectation about the severity of tax enforcement and by this way tax compliance. In addition,
province elections occur at intervals which are established by law (i.e. every 5 years),13 therefore
the timing of election is exogenous and the time of elections is di¤erent across provinces.14
12From the administrative point of view, the Italian territory is organized in regions, provinces and municipalities.
Provinces have administrative tasks in province areas and in inter municipality territory; they have coordination tasks
and are in charge of the implementation of public works in various sectors, including the economic, productive, trade
sectors; they carry out programming activity for the provincial territory.
13 In the period under study the legislation regulating the election and the tasks of province level representatives
was the Testo Unico, G.U. n. 227 del 28 settembre 2000, s.o. n. 162/L. The legislation was reformed in 2014. Between
2007 and 2010 elections occurred before the end of the natural term only in 13 provinces. In most cases anticipation
was due to the resignation of the President motivated by the choice to campaign in the Parliament election.
14 In our sample period there are 98 elections episods: 8 in 2007, 20 in 2008, 68 in 2009 and 8 in 2010.
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4 Data sources and descriptive statistics
4.1 Firms data
Firm level data are drawn from AIDA (Analisi Informatizzata delle Aziende Italiane) produced by
Bureau van Dijk (BvD). BvD collects balance sheet data from the national Chambers of Commerce.
The version of Aida used in our analysis includes all Italian rms that have reported their nancial
statement to the national Chamber of Commerce in the period 2007-2010, for a total of more than
800,000 Italian rms operating in all productive sectors. Apart from balance sheet data, Aida
provides a wide range of nancial and descriptive information (industry and activity codes, rm age,
etc.) and the number of employees. Moreover, AIDA gives information on the location of rms at
a municipality level, allowing the match of rmsdata with the courtsdatabase.
The Aida database has a drawback, as it does not allow to distinguish between newly created
rms and rms that simply enter the sample at a given period t but were already operating in the
period before; similarly, it is not possible to identify rmsclosures from rms that exit the sample
for other reasons. Therefore, we have restricted the analysis to continuing rms, e.g. rms that
are in the sample for at least two consecutive periods.15 Given this limitation and after cleaning
the database from outliers and missing information, our nal sample consists of around 160,000
private rms operating in both the manufacturing and non manufacturing sectors.16 Observations
are annual and cover the period from 2007 to 2010. We dene job reallocation at rm level as the
absolute value of the change in employment between two consecutive periods divided by the average
employment between the two periods (see Capellari et al. 2011; Kugler and Pica, 2008, Autor et al,
2007):
JT =
jnft   nft 1j
1
2 (nft + nft 1)
Labour productivity is obtained as the log of value added per worker. To preserve comparability
between treatment and control groups, we further restrict the sample to rms within the interval
1020 employees, yielding a sample size of slightly more than 50,000 observations (19464 rms).
Tables 3 shows the descriptive statistics.
15Our sample is therefore unbalanced and potentially includes entry and exit rms. In section XXX we provide
some results obtained by using a balanced sample which includes only rms that are continuously observable every
year from 2007 and 2010.
16The sectors are: (1) Agriculture, forestry and shing; (2) Mining and quarrying; (3) Food, beverages and to-
bacco;(4) Textiles; (5) Wood products; (6) Paper products, publishing and printing; (7) Rened petroleum, nuclear
fuel and chemical products; (8) Rubber and plastic products; (9) Other non-metallic products; (10) Basic metals
and fabricated metal products; (11) Machinery and equipment; (12) Electrical and optical equipment; (13) Transport
equipment; (14) Other manufacturing sectors; (15) Electricity, gas and water supply; (16) Construction; (17) Whole-
sale and retail trade, Repairs; (18) Hotels and restaurants; (19) Transport and communications; (20) Other services.
The nancial and public sectors are excluded from the analysis.
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TABLE 1 AROUND HERE
In our sample the average rm has a value added per worker of around 61 thousands euros and
employs 14 workers. The average rate of job reallocation is around 19 percentage point.
Our identication strategy relies on the assumption that rms do not endogenously sort in or out
of treatment. Figure 1 displays the distribution of rms between 10 to 20 workers. If any signicant
manipulation occurred because of increased ring costs the graph should display a dip on the 15
workers threshold, which is not observed; rather density smoothly declines with the increase in the
number of workers.17 In addition, while the inclusion of rm xed e¤ect in our estimations should
capture all time-invariant unobserved factors that may a¤ect rmspropensity to self-select above
or below the threshold, the issues of rmssorting and of the measurement of the threshold will be
more specically addressed in section 6.2.
FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE
4.2 Informality and tax gap data
The extent of underground activities and informal economy is di¢ cult to detect and measure. Since
workers and rms who operate irregularly are unlikely to provide information on their hidden activi-
ties, this makes it di¢ cult to obtain direct data on informality at rm level. Nevertheless, a number
of reliable indicators has been produced in order to measure the informal economy at a more ag-
gregate level. We use tax evasion estimated at the province level as a proxy of the costs for rms
and workers of being informal in that particular area.18 We claim that rms operating in provinces
with a higher level of tax evasion, face lower costs of accessing the informal sector and, therefore,
can more easily use irregular workers as a bu¤er stock for the regulated formal employment.19
Data on tax evasion for Italian provinces are provide by the Italian Revenue Agency (Agenzia
delle Entrate). The dataset contains data on the expected as well as the actual nancial revenue
reported to scal authorities in the 107 Italian provinces from 2007 to 2010. The novelty of the
database relates to the methodology used to estimate tax gap based on an integration of the top-
down approach, based on the comparison and cross-checking (matching) between national accounts
and administrative scal data, and the bottom-up approach, based on results from scal audits
17The same pattern is observed also in other studies on the Italian EPL, so that our graphical results on the of
signicant manipulation are in line with a body of empirical analysis focusing on the e¤ects of the discontinuity in
dismissal costs in Italy (Boeri and Jimeno, 2005; Schivardi and Torrini, 2008; Leonardi and Pica, 2013, Cingano et al.
2014).
18Clearly, employment informality and rm informality are di¤erent concepts. Nevertheless, one would expect
employment informality and rm informality to be highly correlated, as tax authorities could detect inconsistencies
between output and employment levels. We therefore decide to use tax gap in a given province as a proxy for
informality opportunity for rms set in that particular geographical area.
19Tax evasion, and, more genereally, the extent of the shadow economy is related to the expected costs of being
informal. Typically this costs are specied in terms of exclusion from certain public goods and services (e.g., social
infrastructure, property rights and the justice system), together with the possibility of nes and other punishments.
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(Carfora et al., 2015). The indicator of tax evasion (tax_gap) has been constructed as the relative
di¤erence of the expected and the reported revenue, i.e.
tax_gap =
(expected revenue  reported revenue):
expected revenue:
Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics concerning the tax gap over the sample period 2007
to 2010 for the 107 Italian provinces, which are ranked from the most to the least tax compliant.
TABLE 2 AROUND HERE
The data show great territorial heterogeneity in the extent of tax evasion; for example, the
di¤erences of the tax gap between the province at the 10th (Avellino) and 90th (Gorizia) percentile
of the tax compliant distribution is around 0.26 percentage points. The standard deviation across
provinces is quite large, being more than one third of the average. The within-province time-series
variation of tax gap is also substantial: the standard deviation normalized on the mean ranges from
0.03 (in Grosseto) to 0.21 (in Firenze), with a sample average of around 0.10. This descriptive
evidence suggests considerable heterogeneity in informality both cross-sectionally and over time.
Descriptive evidence of the link between informality and productivity around the 15-employees
cut-o¤ is provided in Figure 2, which plots labour productivity just below and above the threshold
cut-o¤ in the two provinces, corresponding to the 10th and 90th percentiles of the tax gap distribution
respectively.
FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE
Figure 2 clearly shows a signicant downward jump of productivity at the 15 employees threshold
in Gorizia where rms facing stricter EPL (rms above the threshold) cannot easily adjust in the
informal labour market. Conversely, the discontinuity around the threshold is smaller and not
statistically signicant in Avellino, one of the province with the highest presence of informality in
Italy . A temptative interpretation of this visual evidence suggests that in the neighborhood of the
15-employees threshold labour productivity seems to respond less to changes in ring costs when
rms can more easily adjust their workforce using informal (not regulated) workers.
In the next sections, we will provide more rigorous evidence of the causal relationship between
informality and productivity by controlling for rmscharacteristics, a number of xed e¤ects and
using instruments to address the potential endogeneity of our proxy for informal sector.
4.3 Data on judges turnover and elections
We draw data on the number of judges allocated to each judicial districts as well as on the number of
inbound and outbound judges from 2006 to 2010 from courtsself regulating body (CSM) database.
Judges turnover at district level is calculated as in Guerra and Tagliapietra (2015) according to the
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following formula:
Turnover =
100x(number of outbound judges+ number of inbound judges)
number of expected judges
=
Data on elections at province level are published on the site of the Italian Ministery of the Interior
(Historical archive of the elections). From 2006 to 2010 there have been 110 province level elections;
table 3 shows the province where elections took place in every year.
TABLE 3 AROUND HERE
5 Empirical specication
We estimate the e¤ect of informality on the turnover of formal jobs and labour productivity using
rm level data. At rm level, the size of rms plays a signicant role in moderating the impact
of informality on rms adjustments and productivity. In our analysis, we exploit the discontinuity
of ring legislation at the 15-employees threshold to identify the causal e¤ect of informality on
productivity.
The model specication is as follows:
yrft = 1tax_gap
r
t + 2size
r
f + 3(taxgap
r
t  sizerf ) + 4incomert
+Xrft +D + f + u
r
ft (1)
where the dependent variable yrft is either the job turnover or productivity (log of value added)
depending on specication; tax_gaprt is the informality index (in log); size
r
f is a dummy variable
which takes value 1 for large rms i.e. rms with number of employees larger than 15, and zero
otherwise;20 Xrfst are a set of other controls which include a polynomial of a third degree in rm
size, f stands for rm xed e¤ects which "absorb" any time-invariant unobservable attributes at
rm level, and in particular the e¤ect of the di¤erent (time-invariant) EPL regime that applies to
rms above and below the 15 employees threshold. The indices r and t refer to provinces and year
respectively. D is the matrix of dummies that includes, depending on the specication considered,
province-by-year21 and industry-by-year dummies while urt is the error term. The coe¢ cient on
tax_gaprt gives the common e¤ect of informality on small and large rms, while the interaction
term tax_gaprt sizerf captures the di¤erential e¤ect of informality induced by the more strict EPL
20We dene rms as small if they have less than 15 employees in all years and large if they have more than 15
employees in all years of the sample period. We also check the robustness of our results to a di¤erent threshold
denition (see section 7.3) and to the inclusion in the sample of rms which move above and below the threshold over
the sample period. Results are available upon request.
21The inclusion of province-by-year dummies allows to control for all province-specic time-varying characteristics
(for example, the quality of local infrastructure) which have the same e¤ects across rms.
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regimes on large rms productivity. The variable tax_gaprt is instrumented with the judgesturnover
in judicial districts and the timing of local (province) elections, while the interaction tax_gaprtsizerf
is instrumented by interacting each instruments with the dummy sizerf :
The two instruments will be used in the IV regressions both separately and jointly, thus producing
three sets of estimates. The results are remarkably robust to every specication. Moreover, in all
regressions we control for di¤erences in the economic development at region level by including among
the regressors region per capita income (GDP).
Given that (time variant) di¤erences in the regional underlying economic conditions (as GDP
per capita) may not necessarily capture all the factors a¤ecting rm productivity (e.g. those factors
related to the institutional environment at large), in section 6.2 we show that our results are also
robust to the inclusion of a full set of province-year and sector-year dummies. In this way, we can
rule out any possible source of bias arising from (time and province variant) omitted factors - not
already captured by the regional income per capita - which could inuence both informality and
productivity, thus yielding further support to our identication strategy.
6 Results
6.1 Baseline model
In Table 4 we report the e¤ect of informality on the reallocation of formal (regulated) jobs at
rm level estimated as in equation 1, using all sets of instruments shown so far. As the variable
measuring informality varies both across provinces and time, we are able to control for any time-
invariant unobserved rm characteristics by the use of rm xed e¤ects, thus fully exploiting the
rm level dimension of the dataset.
TABLE 4 AROUND HERE
Tax evasion has no signicant e¤ect on labour adjustments for rms under the 15 workers thresh-
old while it has a negative impact for rms employing more than 15 workers. The coe¢ cient of the
interaction term is always negative and signicant and the overall coe¢ cient estimated for large
rms is around 0.31 when both instruments are used in the estimation. Based on the coe¢ cients
reported in column 3, the estimated di¤erential e¤ect for rms above the 15 employees threshold is
-0.405. This implies that moving from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the informality distribution
(i.e. from the province of Gorizia to Avellino in our sample), would lead to a 10 percentage points
decrease in the turnover of formal employment for rms above the threshold to smaller rms.
In all cases the two instruments are relevant, as the null that the equation is underidentied is
always rejected, while the F statistics is well above the rule of thumb threshold of 10 in all cases.
Furthermore, the overidentication test does not reject the null that the instrument are uncorrelated
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with the error term. First stage regressions are displayed in table 6, while table 7 shows ndings
from OLS estimates.22
Table 5 shows the e¤ect of informality on rmslabour productivity.
TABLE 5 AROUND HERE
In all cases the overall e¤ect of tax evasion on rmsproductivity is negative and signicant;
this result is in line with previous literature. However, the interaction coe¢ cient is positive and
signicant. This implies that in presence of a stricter employment legislation (rms above the
threshold), rms react by adjusting in the informal sector. This mitigates the negative impact of
informality on productivity.
Based on the coe¢ cients reported in column 3, the estimated di¤erential coe¢ cient for rms
above the 15 employees threshold is 0.609, which implies that reducing the informality rate of
Avellino to the rate of Gorizia, would lead to a decrease of the average value added per worker in
rms above the threshold by around 16%.
6.2 Robustness
6.2.1 The inclusion of province/sectors by year dummies
The di¤erential impact informality on job reallocation and productivity for rms above and below
the 15-employees threshold is remarkably robust to the inclusion of province-by-year dummies, as
shown in table 8. In this specication the main e¤ect (tax_gap) is not included because it is absorbed
by the province-year dummies, which also capture all time variant and province specic factors that
may a¤ect simultaneously the extent of informality and rmsproductivity.23 The stability of the
coe¢ cient on the tax_gap  size interaction term when adding province-year dummies provides
further reassurance that the estimated di¤erential e¤ect is not driven by any possible source of bias
arising from province-time variant omitted factors. The coe¢ cients in columns 2 and 4 show that our
results are also robust to the inclusion of sector specic year dummies, implying that the estimated
e¤ect is not driven by any industry specic time varying conditions.
TABLE 8 AROUND HERE
6.2.2 Robustness to di¤erent sample size and threshold specication
In Table 9 we check the robustness of our main results by widening the sample to include rms within
the size interval 6-25 employees. Our results are robust to the change in the size range (column 1
and 4): the estimated coe¢ cients on the interaction (tax_gap  size) are similar to those in Tables
22The coe¢ cients of the rst stage regressions show that both instruments are correlated with our endogenous
regressors conrming the relevance of our instruments.
23 In this set of regressions the identication of the e¤ect comes entirely from the di¤erential in the EPL provisions
for rms above and below the threshold.
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4 and 5, conrming the relative negative e¤ect of informality of the turnover rate of regulated jobs
and the positive e¤ect on productivity in the rms facing higher ring costs.
TABLE 9 AROUND HERE
An additional concern may be that the 15-employees threshold is imprecisely estimated at rm
level due to the complex calculation of the workforce, in particular because of presence of part-time
workers (see for a discussion Hijzen et al., 2014) 24 . In order to address this problem, we check
the robustness of our results to the exclusion of rms between 14/15 and 16/17 employees from the
sample. We therefore compare the e¤ect of informality on labour adjustment and productivity of
rms between 5 and 13/14 employees (control group) and rms between 17/18 and 25 employees
(treatment group). Those rms are su¢ ciently above and below the threshold to avoid the problem
of measurement error in the estimation of the size cut-o¤. Results are remarkably robust to this
change (columns 2, 3, 5, 6).
6.2.3 Firm growth regressions
The validity of the RDD rests on the assumption that rms do not self select above or below the
threshold; in other terms we have to exclude that rms may manipulate the number of workers in
order to escape strict EPL or that informality inuences rms manipulation. As in Schivardi and
Torrini and Hijzen et al. (2008)25 , we check for the potential sorting induced by informality by
estimating the following linear probability model for the probability of growth of rms around the
threshold:
gft = Sft + (Sft  tax_gaprt ) +Xft +D'+ f + urft (2)
where gft = 1 if rm f in year t has a larger size than in t   1. The term Sft denotes a set of
size dummies for rms with 13, 14 and 15 employees and tax_gaprt is our variable for informality
at province level. The matrix Xft includes a set of controls at rm level such as a third-degree
polynomial in rm size. Finally, we also include rm xed e¤ects to account for rm-specic time-
invariant factors that may a¤ect rmspropensity to grow. We instrument the interactions (Sft 
tax_gaprt ) with the two instruments (interacted with the size dummies) already used in our baseline
specications (e.g. judgesturnover rates and a dummy for local elections). The results are reported
in Table 10.
24As in Schivardi and Torrini (2008), Garibaldi et al. (2004) and Gianfreda and Vallanti (2017) our measure of
rm size does not distinguish between full and part time workers. However, the problem of misclassication due to
partimers have been shown to be relatively negligeable if the interval in rm size is not too short, ranging from 2.7 to
5.8% from 5-25 to 11-20 rms size (Hijzen et al. 2013).
25The result that EPL provisions do not a¤ect rms propensity to grow is not new in the empirical literature. See
among the others, Cingano et al (2015), Leonardi and Pica (2013) and Schivardi and Torrini (2005) which examine
the e¤ect of EPL on rmssize distribution below and above the 15 employees-threshold in Italy.
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TABLE 10 AROUND HERE
Column 1 shows that the probability of expansion of rms just below 15 employees is not sig-
nicantly di¤erent from that of other rms.26 Moreover, all the interaction terms are not signi-
cant, implying that informality do not a¤ect such a probability. Columns 2- 4 report the results
obtained splitting the sample in di¤erent productivity percentile and once again the growth prob-
ability for rms just below the threshold is not signicantly a¤ected by informality in any of the
sub-samples. These results conrm that informality does not a¤ect signicantly the propensity to
grow in the formal sector around the 15-employee threshold and therefore self-selection of rms into
treatment/control.
7 Conclusions
We assess the impact of informality on labour market adjustments and then rms productivity. We
argue that in presence of high ring costs, informality may allow rms greater exibility in their
employment and production decisions which, in turn, can lead them to operate more e¢ ciently and
increase productivity.
Exploiting the variability of the extent of tax compliance across Italian provinces and the discon-
tinuity of the ring legislation at the 15-employees threshold, we show that informality signicantly
reduces the reallocation rate of regulated jobs. This provides some evidence of the substitution
between formal (regulated) jobs and jobs created in the informal sector for rms in operating in a
stricter EPL regime. Moreover, while the overall e¤ect of informality on productivity is negative
 in line with the literature the incremental e¤ect of informality on labor productivity for rms
facing higher ring costs (i.e. rms above the 15 workersthreshold) is positive. This last result
suggests that rms operating in a highly regulated environment may get some benet in terms of
productivity from adjusting in the informal sector.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics on firm variables  
 Mean St. Dev. p10 p50 p90 
Whole sample (11-20) 
VA per worker (000) 61.01 103.18 26.63 47.62 97.28 
Flows 0.19 0.25 0 0.10 0.44 
Firm size 14.35 2.64 11 14 18 
Small firms (11-15) 
VA per worker (000) 61.36 105.7 27.077 47.75 97.91 
Flows 0.18 0.25 0 0.09 0.44 
Large firms (16-20) 
VA per worker (000) 60.25 97.38 25.75 47.25 95.6875 
Flows 0.19 0.26 0 0.11 0.46 
Source: AIDA database and authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Firm size distribution 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics on Tax Gap 
Name 
tax 
gap 
st. 
dev Name 
tax 
gap 
st. 
dev Name 
tax 
gap 
st. 
dev 
Roma 0.116 0.021 Pisa 0.280 0.043 Pesaro U. 0.477 0.086 
Trieste 0.118 0.024 Lecco 0.280 0.045 Pavia 0.482 0.064 
Monza 0.125 0.012 Cagliari 0.292 0.029 Asti 0.495 0.038 
Bologna 0.128 0.018 Napoli 0.303 0.012 Brindisi 0.499 0.036 
Milano 0.136 0.011 Venezia 0.305 0.031 Verbania 0.509 0.046 
Parma 0.163 0.024 Savona 0.310 0.025 Barletta 0.517 0.024 
Genova 0.166 0.020 Treviso 0.314 0.044 Biella 0.537 0.069 
Bolzano 0.182 0.005 Vicenza 0.318 0.051 Reggio C. 0.584 0.055 
Trento 0.191 0.005 Cremona 0.319 0.024 Pistoia 0.595 0.077 
Chieti 0.194 0.034 Varese 0.328 0.049 Latina 0.623 0.033 
Torino 0.200 0.035 Vercelli 0.330 0.040 Imperia 0.624 0.043 
Gorizia 0.200 0.028 Mantova 0.350 0.080 Campobasso 0.625 0.038 
Siena 0.206 0.028 Lucca 0.354 0.054 Trapani 0.628 0.056 
Fermo 0.206 0.014 Palermo 0.365 0.036 Grosseto 0.628 0.026 
Firenze 0.207 0.056 Ferrara 0.369 0.068 Frosinone 0.631 0.069 
Pordenone 0.215 0.046 Sassari 0.371 0.011 Caserta 0.635 0.037 
Novara 0.233 0.034 Perugia 0.391 0.034 Nuoro 0.643 0.137 
Reggio E. 0.234 0.054 Taranto 0.392 0.080 Oristano 0.650 0.021 
Modena 0.234 0.059 Belluno 0.399 0.063 Ragusa 0.671 0.037 
Udine 0.236 0.050 Cuneo 0.402 0.024 Salerno 0.683 0.014 
Como 0.240 0.026 Rovigo 0.402 0.075 Caltanissetta 0.700 0.072 
La Spezia 0.242 0.027 Foggia 0.406 0.021 Viterbo 0.703 0.056 
Bergamo 0.245 0.048 L'Aquila 0.413 0.076 Potenza 0.713 0.053 
Ravenna 0.251 0.043 Alessandria 0.414 0.036 Avellino 0.726 0.062 
Messina 0.255 0.042 Bari 0.415 0.023 Agrigento 0.727 0.035 
Aosta 0.256 0.016 Massa 0.430 0.072 Isernia 0.733 0.201 
Pescara 0.258 0.037 Terni 0.432 0.034 Ascoli P. 0.781 0.077 
Livorno 0.260 0.060 Catania 0.432 0.038 Benevento 0.805 0.050 
Ancona 0.265 0.032 Prato 0.434 0.058 Lecce 0.834 0.027 
Forlì 0.266 0.030 Arezzo 0.438 0.039 Cosenza 0.854 0.063 
Piacenza 0.266 0.056 Lodi 0.452 0.088 Enna 0.904 0.034 
Brescia 0.270 0.057 Catanzaro 0.455 0.042 Rieti 0.969 0.091 
Padova 0.271 0.041 Rimini 0.471 0.046 Matera 0.998 0.078 
Sondrio 0.274 0.043 Teramo 0.474 0.057 Crotone 1.073 0.090 
Siracusa 0.274 0.033 Macerata 0.476 0.055 Vibo V. 1.184 0.039 
Verona 0.275 0.025                  
Mean   0.430      
Between-group st. dev. 0.226      
Whitin-group st. dev. 0.046      
Source: Agenzia delle Entrate database and authors’ calculations. 
 
  
 Figure 2. Productivity and firm size 
 
 
Notes. The dots are the observed (log) productivity averaged over the sample period. The solid line is a fitted 
regression of (log) productivity on a third-degree polynomial in firm size, performed separately on either side of 
the threshold 
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Table 3 - Province Elections 
Year Province 
2006 Campobasso; Gorizia; Imperia; Lucca; Mantova; Pavia; Ravenna; 
Reggio Calabria; Trapani; Treviso; Trieste; Udine 
2007 Ancona; Como; Genova; La Spezia; Ragusa; Varese; Vercelli; Vicenza 
2008 Agrigento; Aosta; Asti; Benevento; Bolzano; Caltanissetta; Catania; 
Catanzaro; Enna; Foggia; Massa; Messina; Palermo; Roma; Siracusa; 
Trapani; Trento; Udine; Varese; Vibo Valentia 
2009 Alessandria; Arezzo; Ascoli Piceno; Avellino; Bari; Barletta; Belluno; 
Bergamo; Biella; Bologna; Brescia; Brindisi; Chieti; Cosenza; Cremona; 
Crotone; Cuneo; Fermo; Ferrara; Firenze; Forlì; Frosinone; Grosseto; 
Isernia; Latina; Lecce; Lecco; Livorno; Lodi; Macerata; Materna; 
Milano; Modena; Monza; Napoli; Novara; Padova; Parma; Perugia; 
Pesaro Urbino; Pescara; Piacenza; Pisa; Pistoia; Pordenone; Potenza; 
Prato; Reggio Emilia; Rieti; Rimini; Rovigo; Salerno; Savona; Siena; 
Sondrio; Taranto; Teramo; Terni; Torino; Venezia; Verbania; Verona 
2010 Cagliari; Caserta; Imperia; L'Aquila; Nuoro; Oristano; Sassari; Viterbo 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Table 4: The effect of informality on firms’ labor reallocation - selected results 
Instrument(s) Judges’ Turnover Election Judges’ Turnover 
and Election    
tax gap 0.317 -0.023 0.197 
 0.398 0.5 0.32 
tax gap x size -0.381 *** -0.518* -0.406*** 
 0.155 0.282 0.143 
size 0.083*** 0.112* 0.088*** 
 0.032 0.059 0.03 
gdp 0.065 -0.034 0.033 
 0.13 0.152 0.116 
  
  
r2 0.068 0.061 0.065 
Obs. 53643 53643 53643 
Number of firms 19464 19464 19464 
First stage statistics    
Underid Test a 708.094 317.353 906.185 
chi-sq (1) P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Weak id Test 480.768 201.456 371.012 
Hansen J stat.  0.518 
 Chi-sq(2) P-value   0.7717 
(***) (**) (*) refer to 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels. Robust standard errors (in italics) are 
clustered at firm level. All estimates are fixed effects; year dummies are always included; a) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic; b) Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic; Instruments: turnover, 
elections and interacted terms. 
 
  
  
Table 5: The effect of informality on firms’ productivity - selected results 
Instrument(s) 
Judges’ 
Turnover Election 
Judges’ Turnover 
and Election 
tax gap -1.720*** -3.384*** -2.260*** 
 0.506 0.752 0.422 
tax gap x size 0.563*** 0.746* 0.609*** 
 0.230 0.400 0.220 
size -0.123*** -0.161* -0.133*** 
 0.049 0.085 0.047 
gdp -0.112 -0.660** -0.292 
 0.201 0.294 0.184 
    
r2 0.08 0.053 0.074 
Obs. 88829 88829 88829 
Number of firms 30345 30345 30345 
First stage statistics    
Underid Test a 762.605 269.008 995.078 
Chi-sq (1) P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Weak id Test 560.747 196.645 364.745 
Hansen J stat.  3.697 
 Chi-sq(2) P-value    0.1575 
(***) (**) (*) refer to 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels. Robust standard errors (in 
italics) are clustered at firm level. All estimates are fixed effects; year dummies are 
always included; a) Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic; b) Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic; Instruments: turnover, elections and interacted terms. 
  
 Table 6. First stage statistics - selected results 
 TG TG x size TG TG x size TG TG x size 
turnover -0.0005272*** -0.0004529***   -0.0005233*** -0.0004292*** 
 0.0000209 0.0000402   0.0000207 0.0000403 
turnover x size 0.0000409** 0.0012491***   0.0000504** 0.0011777*** 
 0.00002 0.0000482   0.0000202 0.0000481 
election   0.00053*** -0.0033249*** 0.003933*** -0.0021035*** 
 
 
 0.00025 0.0003108 0.0002442 0.0003033 
election x size  
 -0.000438 0.0129232*** -0.0005784* 0.0095177*** 
   0.0003251 0.0005804 0.0003168 0.0005523 
       
F 335.60 407.18 148.32 309.75 241.96 270.08 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(Weak id) SW a 676.37 747.50 298.92 649.66 326.60 374.26 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
       
(***) (**) (*) refer to 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels. Robust standard errors (in italics) are clustered at firm 
level. All estimates are fixed effects; year dummies are always included. a) Sanderson-Windmeijer F statistics.  
 
Table 7 - OLS and reduced form selected results 
 labour reallocation  firms' productivity 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
tax gap 0.255***    -0.399***    
 0.063    0.073    
tax gap x size -0.06    0.067*    
 0.038    0.036    
turnover  0  0  0.001**  0.001** 
  0  0  0  0 
turnover x size  -0.001**  -0.001**  0.001**  0.001** 
  0  0  0  0 
election   0.002 0.001   -0.016*** -0.015*** 
   0.003 0.003   0.003 0.003 
election x size   -0.008* -0.007   0.011** 0.01* 
   0.004 0.004   0.005 0.005 
size 0.016* 0.02** 0.006 0.021** -0.019* -0.023** -0.008 -0.023** 
 0.009 0.009 0.005 0.009 0.01 0.01 0.006 0.01 
gdp 0.084 0.009 0.025 0.005 0.26** 0.45*** 0.31** 0.373*** 
 0.091 0.094 0.091 0.095 0.118 0.119 0.118 0.121 
         
r2 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 
N 72928 72928 72928 72928 108941 108941 108941 108941 
(***) (**) (*) refer to 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels. Robust standard errors (in italics) are clustered at firm 
level. All estimates are fixed effects; year dummies are always included. 
  
Table 8. The effect of tax gap on firms’ labour adjustment and 
productivity - province x year and sector x year interactions - selected 
results 
 Labour adjustment Firms productivity 
     
tax gap x size -0.426*** -0.436*** 0.583** 0.595** 
 0.144 0.144 0.221 0.22 
size 0.091*** 0.093*** -0.129** -0.131** 
 0.03 0.03 0.047 0.047 
gdp -15.292*** -12.778** -14.93*** -13.89*** 
 4.518 4.581 2.79 2.808 
     
province x year yes yes yes yes 
sector x year no yes no yes 
r2 0.079 0.086 0.091 0.101 
N 53643 53643 88829 88829 
(***) (**) (*) refer to 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels. Robust standard errors 
(in italics) are clustered at firm level. All estimates are fixed effects. 
  
 Table 7: The effect of tax gap on firms’ labour reallocation and productivity (6-25 workers 
sample) - selected results 
 labour adjustment firms' productivity 
 whole sample 5-14 & 17-25 5-13 & 18-25 whole sample 5-14 & 16-25 5-13 & 18-25 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
TG 0.408* 0.330 0.433 -1.822*** -1.745*** -1.661*** 
 0.234 .256 0.28 0.292 0.316 0.344 
TG x size -0.542*** -0.541*** -0.673*** 0.602*** 0.563** 0.55* 
 0.122 .147 0.176 0.194 0.244 0.299 
size 0.124*** 0. .146*** 0.219*** -0.137*** -0.134** -0.147** 
 0.025 0.031 0.039 0.041 0.053 0.066 
gdp 0.005 0.030 0.082 -0.062 -0.027 -0.024 
 0.086 0.093 0.101 0.13 0.14 0.15 
       
Obs 122647 107794 34507 207550 183893 160478 
No firms 42687 39038 93110 67426 62243 55876 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
(***) (**) (*) refer to 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels. Robust standard errors (in italics) are clustered at 
firm level. All estimates are fixed effects; year dummies are always included. Instruments: turnover and elections 
and interacted terms. 
 
Table 8: Probability of growth around the threshold and tax gap 
 Whole sample Percentiles 
  25 50 75 
size13 -0.07 0.133 0.149 0.082 
 0.086 0.191 0.132 0.101 
size14 -0.16 0.082 0.007 -0.004 
 0.097 0.232 0.154 0.111 
size15 -0.068 0.223 0.011 -0.04 
 0.102 0.193 0.147 0.12 
Tax gap x size13 0.236 -0.656 -0.775 -0.482 
 0.418 0.81 0.588 0.471 
Tax gap x size13 0.628 -0.556 -0.167 -0.132 
 0.471 0.989 0.685 0.519 
Tax gap  x size13 0.338 -0.91 -0.028 0.194 
 0.491 0.811 0.645 0.554 
    
 
Obs. 52562 9704 23322 37772 
Firms 19043 3784 8733 13920 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parenthesis. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value 
of 1 if employment at time t is larger than employment at time t-1, and 0 otherwise. Firms between 11 
and 20 workers are included. All specifications include a polynomial of firm size. Interactions of Tax 
gap  are instrumented with the interactions of Election and Turnover. 
 
 
